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G8 PRINCIPLES: IDENTIFYING THE ANONYMOUS
Max Biedermann*

Over two million companies and thousands of banks call offshore tax
havens home. 1 It is unknown exactly how much money is hidden, but
estimates range as high as twenty trillion dollars. 2 Over the past few
years, the international community, and especially the United States, has
focused on the battle to expose these offshore bank accounts. 3 Much
progress has been made, as evidenced by the fact that the once highly
secretive Swiss banking system has officially issued an “unusually direct
apology for their role in helping tax cheats, following a landmark
settlement with U.S. authorities.” 4 Bank secrecy attracts headlines due to
high profile cases involving millionaires and billionaires caught hiding
their fortunes. 5 However, another vehicle that allows tax evasion, money
laundering, and other financial crimes, which has not properly been
addressed by the international community until recently, 6 is the use of
shell corporations and other corporate vehicles to hide the true owners of
assets. “In the past, people hid their involvement with funds through
anonymous bank accounts or accounts in fictitious names;” 7 but now that
this option has been limited due to increased pressure on jurisdictions
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of North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation. The author would like
to thank his family for their support throughout the writing of this note and Josh Becker, J.D.
Candidate 2015, University of Miami School of Law, for his tax and editing insights.
1
The Missing $20 Trillion, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 16, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21571873-how-stop-companies-and-people-dodging-taxdelaware-well-grand-cayman-missing-20.
2
See id.
3
For discussion, see Itai Greenberg, The Battle over Taxing Offshore Accounts, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 304 (2012).
4
Swiss Banks Apologize for Assisting Tax Cheats, REUTERS, Sep. 3, 2013 7:18 am,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/03/us-usa-tax-switzerland-idUSBRE97S14B20130903. For
more discussion on Swiss sovereignty and international banking, see Helga Turku, The International
System of States' Checks and Balances on State Sovereignty: The Case of Switzerland, 38 N.C.J.
INT'L L. & COM. REG. 809 (2013).
5
For example, Ty Warner, the creator of Beanie Babies and the 209th richest American, with
an estimated net worth of 2.9 billion, recently admitted to committing tax evasion. He agreed to pay
a $53 million dollar fine as a result of being caught "hid[ing] more than $3m (£1.9m) of income in a
secret Swiss bank account.” See Beanie Babies creator Ty Warner to admit tax evasion, BBC NEWS,
Sep. 18, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-24155274.
6
See G8 Summit, Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, United Kingdom, June 17-18, 2013, G8
Action Plan Principles to Prevent the Misuse of Companies and Legal Arrangements, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-ofcompanies-and-legal-arrangements/g8-action-plan-principles-to-prevent-the-misuse-of-companiesand-legal-arrangements [hereinafter G8 Principles].
7
EMILE VAN DER DOES DE WILLEBOIS, EMILY M. HALTER, ROBERT A. HARRISON, JI WON
PARK, & J.C. SHARMAN, THE PUPPET MASTERS 29 (2010), available at
http://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9780821388945 [hereinafter PUPPET MASTERS].
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with secretive banking practices to turn over records, 8 the new preferred
method for those seeking anonymity is to use a corporate vehicle. 9
The anonymity that corporate vehicles provide is often abused by
those seeking nefarious ends. For example, Viktor Bout was placed on
Interpol’s wanted list for charges of money laundering in 2002. 10 The
United States government also suspected Bout of being the major source
of arms in African conflicts, such as Sierra Leon, and as an arms supplier
for the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.11 Even though Bout was a
well-known arms merchant and embargo buster, 12 he was able to carry
on his business until he was arrested in Bangkok, Thailand in 2008. 13
One way that Bout was able to stay ahead of law enforcement was by
using corporate vehicles registered in jurisdictions around the world to
constantly move assets. 14 The question remains, how was this arms
dealer and member of Interpol’s wanted list able to register corporate
vehicles and use them for illicit purposes?
One problem with anonymous corporate vehicles is that people and
organizations can use them for nefarious purposes without leaving a
paper trail. 15 While many of these cases involve corruption, it is difficult
for authorities to catch those responsible because of the difficulty
tracking down the owners of corporate vehicles in some jurisdictions. 16
Because governments have trouble dealing with this issue, third parties
have resorted to more unconventional measures. 17 One of the most
successful attempts to reveal the anonymous ownership of corporate
vehicles was carried out by the International Consortium of Investigative
Reporters, when it revealed two million documents that exposed the
ownership of “thousands of companies and trusts set up in the British

8
See, e.g., Turku, supra note 4, at 268-71 (discussing the domestic and international forces that
have changed Swiss banking laws).
9
A corporate vehicle “is mainly used to refer to companies (or corporations), foundations and
trusts, and national variations of these.” See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 29.
10
See Kathi Austin, Illicit Arms Brokers: Aiding and Abetting Atrocities, 9 BROWN J. WORLD
AFF. 203 (2002).
11
See DOUGLAS FARAH, MERCHANT OF DEATH: MONEY, GUNS, PLANES, AND THE MAN WHO
MAKES WAR POSSIBLE 5 (2008).
12
See Austin, supra note 10, at 203.
13
See Jonathan Stempel, Russian Arms Dealer Viktor Bout's U.S. Conviction Upheld,
REUTERS, Sept. 27, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/27/us-usa-crime-boutidUSBRE98Q0PG20130927.
14
See FARAH, supra note 11, at 9 (stating that Bout registered shell companies in such places
as Texas, Florida, and Delaware).
15
Cyrus R. Vance, Jr., It’s Time to Eliminate Anonymous Shell Companies, REUTERS, Oct. 9,
2012,
http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2012/10/09/its-time-to-eliminate-anonymous-shellcompanies/.
16
For example, in 2002, the Kenyan government chose to pay 31.39 million Euros to a holding
company incorporated in the United Kingdom called Anglo-Leasing to set up a new passport
printing system, instead of choosing a 6 million Euros bid from a French company. Anglo-Leasing
subcontracted the work out to the French company. When “whistle-blowers suggested that corrupt
senior politicians planned to pocket the excess fund from the deal . . . [a]ttempts to investigate these
allegations were frustrated [] when it proved impossible to find out who controlled Anglo-Leasing.”
See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 1.
17
Some countries have resorted to purchasing information on beneficiaries that is stolen by
bank insiders. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 315.
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Virgin Islands and Cook Islands.” 18 Times appear to be changing,
however, and governments seem willing to properly address the
problems created by anonymous corporate vehicles. 19 After the June
2013 summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, the G8 20 announced
action plan principles to prevent the misuse of companies and legal
arrangements (hereinafter “G8 Principles”). These Principles aim to
establish new international norms that will help combat the abuse of
anonymous corporate vehicles. 21
This note will argue that the G8 Principles’ increased reporting and
recording requirements of the identities of corporate beneficiaries, and
the G8’s support of an automatic exchange of information between tax
authorities, are major steps in policing tax avoidance, money laundering,
and other financial crimes involving anonymous corporate vehicles. This
note is organized in three parts. Part I will delve deeper into the problems
related to tracking the anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles. It
will also examine the steps that the international community has already
taken in an attempt to combat this issue. Part II will breakdown the G8
Principles outlined in the action plan. Finally, Part III will discuss how
the G8’s Principles will likely affect criminal uses of anonymous
corporate vehicles.
I. TRACKING ANONYMOUS BENEFICIARIES
A. Defining a Beneficiary
Beneficial ownership of an asset first originated as a legal concept in
the United Kingdom. 22 A beneficiary is a person who “ultimately
controls an asset and can benefit from it.” 23 The Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) has defined beneficial ownership as follows: a
“[b]eneficial owner refers to the natural person(s) who ultimately owns
or controls a customer and/or the natural person on whose behalf a
transaction is being conducted. It also includes those persons who
exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or arrangement.” 24
18
Id. See Leaky Devils, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 13, 2013, available at
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576146-tax-havens-start-reassess-theirbusiness-models-leaky-devils. The list of owners included a range of people “from Asian politicians
to Canadian lawyers—and no fewer than 4,000 Americans.” Id.
19
For discussion on some recent actions from governments see infra part I section C.
20
The G8 includes: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, United States of America,
and
the
United
Kingdom.
See
UK
Presidency
of
G8
2013,
GOV.UK,
https://www.gov.uk/government/topical-events/g8-2013 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013).
21
See G8 Principles, supra note 6.
22
For a brief discussion on the origins of beneficiaries in trust law, see PUPPET MASTERS,
supra note 7, at 18.
23
Id.
24
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, International Standards on Combating
Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation - the FATF Recommendations
110
(2012),
available
at
http://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf
[hereinafter
FATF Recommendations].
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There are two key concepts espoused by the FATF definition that make it
especially applicable to the fight against anonymous corporate vehicles.
First, it refers to the fact that “a beneficial owner is always a natural
person.” 25 This point acknowledges that there is always a person or
group of people who stand to benefit from a corporate vehicle.
Consequently, these people need to be identified in order to effectively
fight their nefarious purposes. 26 Second, beneficial ownership
encompasses “control over a legal person or arrangement,” which
extends the definition of a beneficiary to those who control corporate
vehicles such as shell corporations. 27
B. Where Are Beneficiaries Hiding?
In order to understand the scope of this issue, it is necessary to
discuss where beneficiaries hide. Some of the most utilized corporate
vehicles are trusts, 28 foundations, 29 and corporations. 30 This note will
focus on the corporate vehicle known as a shell company, which is “the
most common means for laundering money, giving and receiving bribes,
busting sanctions, evading taxes, and financing terrorism.” 31
In 2011, the World Bank conducted a study of 213 large-scale
corruption cases and determined that over 70% of them relied on shell
companies. 32 The FATF defines a shell company as one that has “no
significant assets or operations.” 33 Shell companies typically do not have
a physical presence (outside of a mailing address), hire employees, or
produce independent economic value. 34 It is not uncommon to find
hundreds, if not thousands, of shell companies registered to the same
address, because most shell companies do not have operations.35 A shell
company’s ownership can be structured in a variety of forms, including
25

PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 19.
See id.
27
See id. at 21.
28
For discussion on the use of trusts, see PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 44–47.
29
For discussion on the use of foundations, see id. at 47–48.
30
See id. at 51.
31
MICHAEL FINDLEY, DAVID NIELSON, & JASON SHARMAN, GLOBAL SHELL GAMES: TESTING
MONEY LAUNDERERS’ AND TERRORIST FINANCIERS’ ACCESS TO SHELL COMPANIES 2 (2012)
[hereinafter SHELL GAMES]; see also DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES
ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND
MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES 2 (2006) (finding, for example, that domestic
shell companies in the United States allow for billions of dollars’ worth of international wire
transfers to be conducted by unknown beneficiaries). It should be noted that not all shell companies
are set up for illicit purposes; legitimate purposes include business finance, mergers and acquisitions,
or estate and tax planning. See FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, THE MISUSE OF CORPORATE
VEHICLES, INCLUDING TRUST AND COMPANY SERVICE PROVIDERS 1 (2006) [hereinafter FINANCIAL
ACTION TASK FORCE].
32
GLOBAL WITNESS, ANONYMOUS COMPANIES
2
(2013),
available
at
http://www.globalwitness.org/library/anonymous-companies-global-witness-briefing.
33
FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 24.
34
See DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, ROLE OF
DOMESTIC SHELL COMPANIES IN FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING: LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES 4 (2006), available at http://www.fincen.gov/LLCAssessment_FINAL.pdf.
35
For example, one building in the Grand Caymans known as Ugland House is officially the
registered home of 18,000 companies. See The Missing $20 trillion, supra note 1.
26

75

WINTER 2015

G8 Principles

having shares “issued to a natural or legal person or in registered or
bearer form.” 36 Bearer shares provide for an additional amount of
anonymity because they allow for anonymous transfers of ownership. 37
This is because whoever is in physical possession of the shares is the
owner of the company. 38
Setting up a shell company has become easier in modern times
because “[s]hell companies can be set up online in dozens of countries in
days or even hours for as little as a few hundred dollars.” 39 There are a
multitude of corporate service providers available over the Internet that
will take care of all the necessary paperwork. 40 For a fee, corporate
service providers offer nominee service, a certificate of incorporation, a
corporate seal, minutes of board meetings, a registry of directors, and a
variety of other corporate documents. 41
In many instances, little information must be provided to legally set
up a company. For example, in the United States,
[a] person who wants to set up a U.S. company typically
provides less information than is required to open a bank
account or get a driver’s license. In most cases, they do
not have to provide the name, address or proof of
identification of a single owner of the new company. 42
Furthermore, even in jurisdictions where there are requirements to obtain
information about the beneficiaries of corporate vehicles, the rules are

36

FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 31, at 1.
See PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 41.
38
See id. Bearer shares have recently been restricted in many jurisdictions. For example, in
August 2013 the government of Panama enacted a new law that immobilizes bearer shares, which
means that the owner of the shares must appoint a guard, who can identify the beneficiary of the
shares, to hold the shares in Panama. See Panama’s government approves bearer shares
immobilization law, SOCIETY OF TRUST AND ESTATE PRACTITIONERS, Aug. 27, 2013,
http://www.step.org/panama%E2%80%99s-government-approves-bearer-shares-immobilizationlaw.
39
SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at 6. For example, “[m]ost U.S. States offer electronic services
that incorporate a new company and many will set up a new company in less than twenty-four hours.
The median fee is less than $100. In Delaware and Nevada, for an extra $1,000, an applicant can set
up a company in less than an hour. Colorado, which incorporates about 5,000 companies each
month, told the Subcommittee that it now sets up ninety-nine percent of its companies by computer
without any human intervention or review of the information provided.” Failure to Identify
Company Owners Impedes Law Enforcement: S. Hrg. 109-845 Before Permanent Subcomm. on
Investigations of the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 109th Cong. 4 (2007)
(opening statement of Senator Levin) [hereinafter Subcommittee Hearing].
40
See, e.g., List of International Corporate Service Providers, SEYCHELLES INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS AUTHORITY, http://www.siba.net/index.php?s=links-icsp (last visited Oct. 10, 2013)
(listing sixty-five corporate service providers that will set up a company in the Seychelles); ACSP
Members,
ASSOCIATION
OF
CORPORATE
SERVICE
PROVIDERS,
http://www.acsp.co.im/memberdb.php (last visited Oct. 10, 2013) (listing 96 corporate service
providers that will set up a company in the Isle of Mann).
41
See Max Heywood, How to Set up an Offshore Company in Ten Minutes, Space for
Transparency, (Apr. 9, 2013), http://blog.transparency.org/2013/04/09/how-to-set-up-an-offshorecompany-in-10-minutes/.
42
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 4.
37
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often not followed. 43
Shelf companies are a subcategory of shell companies. Shelf
companies are aptly named because they are shell companies that have
been “aged” to add to their credibility. They are available for purchase
off of a figurative “shelf” from a corporate service provider. 44 Once a
shelf company is purchased, the buyer may acquire the company’s credit
and tax history, which further increases its credibility. 45 This lack of
accurate and recorded information about shell companies means “[s]hell
companies [] cannot be linked back to the real individuals in control.” 46
This “create[s] near-insuperable obstacles for regulators and law
enforcement officials,” 47 and frustrates international efforts to increase
transparency because there simply is no information to disclose to other
countries when they request it. 48
C. Existing International Regulations Attempting to Track
Beneficiaries
“Most governments of major developed countries agree that access
to information from other countries is vital to the full and fair
enforcement of their tax laws.” 49 As a result, individual states and the
international community as a whole have attempted to stop the abuse of
corporate vehicles by creating laws and agreements that are designed to
help identify anonymous corporate beneficiaries. This section will
explore the following three recent developments that have attempted to
identify anonymous beneficiaries: (1) the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Model Tax Convention on
Income and on Capital; (2) the FATF Recommendations; and (3) the
United States’ Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA).

43
In 2012 the Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University published the
results of a study that was conducted to test “whether international rules are actually effective when
they mandate those selling shell companies must collect identifying documents from their
customers.” To gather evidence, the study sent out “more than 7,200 email solicitations to more than
3,700 Corporate Service Providers that make and sell shell companies in 182 countries.” It found
that “nearly forty-eight percent of all replies received did not ask for proper identifications, and
twenty-two percent did not ask for any identity documents at all.” SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at
summary.
44
See Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 5; see also Shelf List, Nevada First Holdings,
http://www.nevadafirst.com/shelfreport.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (containing a list of 51
registered shell companies some of which already have bank accounts); see also Shell List, Panama
Offshore Center, http://www.panamaoffshorecenter.com/?cnt=14 (last visited Oct. 9, 2013)
(containing a an available shell company in Panama that was incorporated in 1985).
45
PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 37.
46
SHELL GAMES, supra note 31, at 6.
47
Id.; see, e.g., Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 6 (“Immigrations and Customs
Enforcement officials reported that a Nevada-based corporation received more than 3,700 suspicious
wire transfers totaling $81 million over two years but the case was not pursued because the Agency
was unable to identify the corporation's owners.”).
48
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7.
49
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 313.

77

WINTER 2015

G8 Principles
1. OECD Model Tax Convention

The OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital
(OECD Model Treaty) is the “world's dominant model tax treaty.” 50
While some commentators believe that the OECD Model Treaty actually
enables shell companies; 51 the treaty does provide for a mechanism that
is designed to allow states to identify and track beneficiaries. Articles 1
and 3 of the OECD Model Treaty identify the individuals that are
covered by the treaty. Article 1 states that the treaty applies “to persons
who are residents of one or both of the contracting states.” 52 The
definition of person is clarified in Article 3 to include a company, and a
company is defined as “any body corporate or any entity that is treated as
body corporate for tax purposes.” 53 Therefore, this treaty would apply to
many of the corporate vehicles that are used by anonymous beneficiaries.
Article 26 (updated in 2012) is the key article that was designed to
aid authorities in pursuing claims against anonymous beneficiaries.
Article 26 covers the rules regarding the exchange of information that is
“foreseeably relevant” to the requesting state’s domestic tax laws.54 The
standard of “foreseeably relevant” is intended to require the exchange of
a wide range of information. 55 The OECD Model Treaty does not
designate when states should exchange information, instead leaving it to
the treaty partners to decide. 56 Between states where there is a mutual
agreement to exchange information, the article “requires information
exchange only upon request, while permitting but not requiring
automatic information exchange.” 57
In addition, Article 26 allows situations where states will not be
forced to provide information. Three important situations include the
following: First, states will not be forced to provide information when
the state would be required “to carry out administrative measures at
variance with the laws and administrative practice of that . . . State.”
Second, relief is provided in situations where the state would be required
“to supply information which is not obtainable under the laws or in the
normal course of the administration of that . . . State.” Third, information
does not need to be disclosed when disclosure of that information would
50

Id. at 314.
See, e.g., Lee Sheppard: Don't Sign OECD Model Tax Treaties!, TAX JUSTICE NETWORK,
(May 31, 2013), http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2013/05/lee-sheppard-dont-sign-oecd-modeltax.html.
52
OECD, Model Tax on Income and Capital 2010 (updated 2010) M-6, OECD Publishing,
Date of signing, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/978926417517-en.
53
Id. at M-9.
54
OECD, UPDATE TO ARTICLE 26 OF THE OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION AND ITS
COMMENTARY
1
[hereinafter
OECD,
UPDATE
2012],
available
at
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/exchangeofinformation/latestdocuments/120718_Article 26-ENG no cover
(2).pdf.
55
OLIVER R. HOOR, THE OECD TAX CONVENTION: A COMPREHENSIVE TECHNICAL ANALYSIS
233 (2010).
56
ANGHARAD MILLER & LYNNE OATS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 7.44 (3d
ed. 2012), available at http://uk.practicallaw.com/books/9781847668790/chapter07#null.
57
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314.
51
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be “contrary to public policy.” 58 These exceptions can be important when
it comes to tracking beneficiaries, especially when recording the identity
of a beneficiary is not “in the normal course of administration of that . . .
State.” 59 It is often the case that, even after a successful request has been
made, there is no information on file to share with a requesting party and
no obligation for the requestee to gather that information for the
requestor. 60
Furthermore, OECD standards do not permit requesting states to
search for potential abuses by its citizens through “fishing expeditions.” 61
Originally, the restriction on “fishing expeditions” was understood to
limit requests to those “about specific taxpayers, identified by name.” 62
However, the commentary to the 2012 update to Article 26 expanded the
definition “fishing expeditions.” 63 According to the commentary:
A request for information relating to a group of
unidentified taxpayers will be viewed as a ‘fishing
expedition’-that is, speculative and lacking nexus-unless
the requesting state can provide the following to the
requested state: (1) a detailed description of the group,
(2) the specific facts and circumstances underlying the
request, (3) an explanation of the applicable law, and (4)
‘why there is reason to believe that the taxpayers in the
group for whom information is requested have been noncompliant with that law supported by a clear factual
basis.’ Furthermore, the requesting state must show that
the requested information ‘would assist’ in determining
whether the taxpayers in the group complied with the tax
law. 64
While the requesting state still must supply a large amount of
information about the beneficiary in order to make a request, the update
to Article 26 has given the requesting state more power to track and
identify beneficiaries. Even after the revision to Article 26, some
scholars believe that information exchanged upon request is an
inadequate measure when it comes to identifying anonymous
beneficiaries because it requires that the requesting state already have
detailed and specific information about the beneficiary. 65

58

OECD, UPDATE 2012, supra note 54, at 1.
Id.
60
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7.
61
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314.
62
Id.
63
OECD, UPDATE 2012, supra note 54, at 3.
64
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 314 n. 26 (citing the commentary to the OECD, UPDATE 2012,
supra note 54, at 3).
65
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 316.
59
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2. FATF Recommendations

The FATF is a policy making body established in 1989 whose
objective is “to set standards and promote effective implementation of
legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating money
laundering, terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of
the international financial system.” 66 The FATF has released a set of
recommendations, most recently in 2012, which have been recognized as
the international standard for combating money laundering and terrorist
financing. 67 It is important to note that “[l]ike the products of other
transgovernmental networks, the recommendations do not create legal
obligations.” 68 Instead, it is better to view the recommendations “as soft
law or pledges by member states.” 69
Recommendation 10 addresses the problem of anonymous
beneficiaries, recommending that financial institutions conduct Customer
Due Diligence (CDD). 70 The recommendation impacts the setup of
corporate vehicles, because it requires financial institutions to conduct
CDD “when establishing business relations.” 71 CDD mandates that
financial institutions identify the customer and verify that the customers
are using reliable, independent source documents. 72 Further, CDD
requires that institutions take reasonable measures to identify the
beneficial owner. 73
Recommendation 11 also addresses problems related to anonymous
beneficiaries because it requires financial institutions to maintain at least
five years’ worth of records related to CDD measures. 74 The records
would include passports, identity cards, driver’s licenses, and other
identifying documents.75 The recommendation requires that these records
be available to authorities upon request.76
While Recommendations 10 and 11 would have beneficial
implications on the fight against anonymous beneficiaries, their success
is limited by the fact that the FATF’s “monitoring mechanisms cannot be
applied to nonmember states.” 77 As a result, the FATF’s monitoring
mechanisms are limited to the thirty-four member states. 78 Furthermore,
even if the state is a member, it does not mean that they have fully
66

Who We Are, FATF (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/.
Id.
68
Kenneth S. Blazejewski, The FATF and Its Institutional Partners: Improving the
Effectiveness and Accountability of Transgovernmental Networks, 22 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1
(2008).
69
Id.
70
FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 14.
71
Id.
72
See id.
73
See id.
74
See id at 15.
75
Id.
76
FATF Recommendations, supra note 24, at 15.
77
Blazejewski, supra note 68, at 18.
78
See
FATF
Members
and
Observers,
FATF
(2014),
http://www.fatfgafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers/#d.en.3147.
67
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complied with FATF Recommendations. 79 For example, the United
States, a leading member of the FATF, was formally cited for failure to
comply with the recommendations in 2006. 80 While the United States
substantially complies with the recommendations, the FATF’s Mutual
Evaluation of the United States found that the United States did not
follow the recommendations in regards to beneficial owners. 81
Specifically, the FATF criticized the United States for not having strong
identification requirements for beneficial owners, for not applying the
recommendations to non-financial businesses, and for having company
formation procedures and reporting requirements that do not provide
adequate, accurate, or timely information on the beneficial ownership of
legal persons. 82 In conclusion, while the FATF Recommendations do
present solutions to many of the problems related to corporate vehicles,
they fall short on remedying those problems.
3. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act
In 2010, the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA)
became law in the United States.83 Beginning in 2014, FATCA required
that U.S. persons and foreign entities with significant U.S. ownership
report information about their foreign financial accounts directly to the
IRS. 84 “The rules are intended to provide reporting both on accounts held
directly by individuals and on interests in accounts held by shell entities
for the benefit of U.S. persons.” 85 FATCA intends to punish financial
institutions that do not comply by placing a withholding tax on payments
from U.S. sources and income earned on U.S. investments by those
financial institutions.86
The goal of FATCA is to force all foreign financial institutions,
including those that do not do business in the United States, to comply
with the law of the United States. 87 It seeks to achieve this goal by way
of the pass-through provision in section 1471. 88 Section 1471 requires
complying foreign financial institutions to withhold payments to noncomplying foreign financial institutions in order to be fully compliant
with FATCA. 89
79
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states. See Blazejewski, supra note 68, at 10.
80
Subcommittee Hearing, supra note 39, at 7.
81
Mutual Evaluation of the United States, FATF (2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/countries/uz/unitedstates/documents/mutualevaluationoftheunitedstates.html
82
Id.
83
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Dec. 19, 2014),
http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/Corporations/Foreign-Account-Tax-Compliance-Act-FATCA.
84
Greenberg, supra note 3, at 334.
85
Id.
86
See id. at 334–35.
87
See id.at 336.
88
26 U.S.C. § 1471(b)(1)(D) (2010).
89
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FATCA also requires financial institutions to report or certify the
ownership of all corporate vehicles that are not exempt under the
regulations. Otherwise, they face the risk of being punished with a thirty
percent withholding tax. 90 This reporting obligation also arises out of
section 1471, which requires financial institutions to report the
ownership of a United States owned foreign entity. 91 Section 1471
defines such an entity as one having “one or more substantial United
States owners.” 92 The threshold of being a “substantial United States
owner” according to FATCA requires ownership of “more than 10
percent of the stock” in a corporation, rights to “more than 10 percent of
the profits interests or capital interests” of a partnership, or indirectly or
directly holding “10 percent beneficial interest” in a trust. 93 The act
mandates that beneficial owners who seek to avoid the withholding tax
submit: “(A) a certification that such beneficial owner does not have any
substantial United States owners, or (B) the name, address, and TIN of
each substantial United States owner of such beneficial owner.” 94 As a
result, FATCA not only requires disclosure of U.S. beneficiaries to
foreign financial services, but also to the IRS.
Despite the potential power of FATCA to discover the identities of
anonymous beneficiaries of corporate vehicles, it does have potential
drawbacks and shortcomings. One commentator has argued that “the
United States could neither implement broadly applicable [pass-through]
payment withholding nor achieve near-comprehensive financial
institution participation through unilateral measures alone.” 95 The
unilateral nature of the law is an issue because the law only benefits the
United States, and “places significant burdens on foreign financial
services.” 96 FATCA would also infringe on the sovereignty of foreign
nations, because it could require the foreign financial services to violate
contractual relationships, as well as data protection, bank secrecy, or
other similar laws. 97 Some have even referred to FATCA as a “new
American imperialism.” 98 Consequently, the United States has begun
entering into bilateral agreements with some foreign nations, in order to
avoid state sovereignty issues. 99 Ultimately, because the law did not
participating foreign financial institutions from doing business with nonparticipating financial
institutions because business between participating and nonparticipating financial institutions may
require withholding under U.S. law.” Id. at 335–36.
90
About
FATCA,
DELOITTE
(Aug.
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2013),
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Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, which calls for an automatic exchange of information
pursuant to FATCA. See Greenberg, supra note 3, at 337.
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officially take effect until 2014, it is still too early to tell how successful
it will be at identifying U.S. persons who are hiding as anonymous
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles.
II. THE G8 PRINCIPLES
The United Kingdom acted as president of the G8 in 2013. 100 Its
leader, Prime Minister David Cameron, announced the following goals
of the summit: advancing trade, ensuring tax compliance, and promoting
transparency. 101 One notable development from the G8 summit was that
it decided to support the G20 and the OECD’s call for the adoption of a
multilateral automatic exchange of information on beneficiaries. 102 The
G8 called for the implementation of this new global standard as soon as
possible. 103 Prime Minister David Cameron’s communiqué from the
summit officially addressed the issues regarding the abuse of corporate
vehicles. 104 The G8 leaders agreed to “make a concerted and collective
effort to tackle [the misuse of shell companies] and improve the
transparency of companies and legal arrangements.” 105 In addition to
reaffirming the G8 member countries’ commitment to implement
FATF’s Recommendations, the leaders agreed to publish national action
plans based off of the G8 Principles, which were published on June 18,
2013. 106
The G8 believes that these principles are “essential to ensure the
integrity of beneficial ownership and basic company information [and]
the timely access to such information by law enforcement for
investigative purposes.” 107 There are eight separate principles within the
G8 Principles, each of which will be explained below.
The first principle requires companies to “know who owns and
controls them and their beneficial ownership.” 108 In order to fulfill this
requirement, companies would be required to keep records of their
ownership. Companies have the burden to make sure that the basic
ownership and beneficial ownership information is adequate, accurate,
and current. 109
The second principle addresses the availability of ownership
information to relevant authorities. 110 “Countries should consider
measures to facilitate access to company beneficial ownership

100
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information by financial institutions and other regulated businesses.” 111
This second principle suggests that states could make companies register
beneficial ownership information on central registries at the national or
state level. 112
The third principle addresses the abuse of trusts by anonymous
beneficiaries. 113 It requires a trustee of an express trust to know who the
beneficial owners of that trust are. 114 In doing so, the trustee would be
required to have information on both the beneficiaries and settlors of the
trust. 115 This information must be made available to law enforcement and
other relevant authorities. 116
The fourth principle focuses on educating authorities on the
weaknesses within their anti-money laundering and terrorism finance
prevention methods. 117 In order to carry out this principle, risk
assessments should be conducted by each state and the results should be
shared both with relevant authorities as well as other states.118 The goal
of this principle is to expose risks and implement effective measures to
enhance the respective state’s methods.119
The fifth principle is designed to combat the use of abusive financial
instruments and shareholding structures that successfully provide
beneficiaries with anonymity. 120 The principle specifically states that the
abuse of mechanisms “such as bearer shares and nominee shareholders
and directors, should be prevented.” 121
The sixth principle is designed to place additional burdens on
financial institutions as well as trust and company service providers.122 It
suggests that states should place customer identification and verification
obligations on those institutions, in order to make sure that beneficiaries
are properly vetted. 123 The principle further suggests that states should
“ensure effective supervision of these obligations.” 124
The seventh principle addresses enforcement mechanisms that
should be employed by states against companies and financial
institutions that do not comply with their obligations. 125 This principle
advocates the use of “[e]ffective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions”
that are to be “robustly enforced” by the states. 126 This principle would
require states to sanction institutions that do not conduct proper CDD
111
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according to FATF Recommendations.127
The eighth principle addresses the need for international cooperation
for information exchange between states regarding the abuse of corporate
vehicles. 128 This principle proposes that national authorities should be
encouraged by states to “rapidly, constructively, and effectively provide
basic company and beneficial ownership information upon request from
foreign counterparts.” 129
In order to ensure that the G8 members fulfill their commitment to
publish national action plans, based on the above principles, and take
actions pursuant to those plans, the G8 agreed “to a process of self
reporting [sic] through a public update on the progress made against
individual action plans and to inform the Financial Action Task
Force.” 130
III. THE IMPACT OF THE PRINCIPLES
While the principles were designed knowing “a one-size-fits all
approach may not be the most effective” 131 approach, the core of the G8
Principles establishes a standard for the identification of beneficial
owners that could have profound impact on the fight against the abuse of
corporate vehicles. This section will expound upon the potential impact
and limitations that may exist in that regard.
A. Beneficial Ownership Disclosure Requirements
The G8 Principles reinforce and expand upon the FATF
Recommendations. For example, both the G8 Principles and the FATF
Recommendations aim to promote the disclosure of information
regarding the identities of beneficiaries.132 One key difference is that the
FATF Recommendations focus on financial institutions, while the G8
Principles extend the burden to the companies themselves. 133 It appears
that the G8 Principles are attempting to kill the weed (abuse of corporate
vehicles) as close to the root (the anonymous beneficiaries) as possible.
This distinction has vast implications because it makes corporations
directly responsible for their information at the risk of being
sanctioned. 134 The G8 Principles would require corporations to keep
127
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records of their ownership. While financial institutions and corporate
service providers would still be required to gather and verify ownership
information, 135 the G8 Principles seek to increase the effectiveness of
those measures by focusing on the companies, which supply that
information to those institutions. This would, for example, place the
burden on companies to know who actually possesses their bearer shares.
A potential drawback to this scheme could arise when corporate
vehicles are less than willing to gather and record the necessary
information. Furthermore, it is unclear who will be responsible for
gathering that information in a shell company. Most shell companies, as
the name implies, are nothing but empty shells with no real operations;136
they do not have employees, executives, or even active directors whose
responsibility it would be to gather the necessary information. This
situation is analogous to telephoning a closed business and trying to
make a request where there is hardly any chance that the message would
be received, let alone acted upon. In order to remedy this problem, the
sanctions supported by the G8 Principles 137 must be strong enough to
force compliance. Sanctions such as freezing the assets of a noncompliant corporate vehicle, while extreme, would certainly get a
beneficiary’s attention.
B. Role of Central Registries
The second G8 Principle recommends that states should make
company information available on central registries. 138 Coupled with the
recommendations for companies to turn over “adequate, accurate, and
current” information about beneficiaries, this provision could be very
successful in identifying anonymous beneficiaries. 139 Currently, most
states already have central registries, which record information about
companies. However, each one differs as to what types of information
are required to set up a company. 140 Central registries will be more
effective as a result of raising the standard for what information needs to
be turned over and recorded. Another way that central registries can be
more effective is the establishment of national registries for all corporate
vehicles, including trusts. In jurisdictions like the United States and the
United Kingdom, individual states and dependencies are allowed to have
135
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their own central registries. 141 The advantages of a national registry are
twofold. First, a national registry allows for one standard regarding
required information pertaining to beneficial owners. Second, a national
registry will ultimately increase the accessibility of information to law
enforcement, tax authorities, and foreign governments because the
information will be stored in one central location.
It is possible to see the potential of an effectively established central
registry by looking at the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists (ICIJ) Offshore Leaks Database. 142 The ICIJ recently
published the Offshore Leaks Database on June 14, 2013. 143 Readers are
allowed to search the database for information about the beneficiaries of
more than 100,000 offshore entities in tax havens. 144 This database
performs the function that a central registry could perform, but on an
international scale. It includes information on shell companies, trusts,
and funds that are located in traditionally secretive jurisdictions such as
the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Cook Islands, and
Singapore. 145 Unlike an official registry, the Offshore Leaks Database is
limited by the information that the ICIJ can uncover. As a result, the
database is not always capable of revealing a corporate vehicle’s true
owners. 146 This is where central registries would have a significant
advantage. They would be able to lean on the power of their respective
states to increase the disclosure of information about beneficiaries. 147
One problem with central registries is the lack of uniform standards for
the specific types of information that they need to obtain. However,
members designed the G8 Principles to become a universal standard that
outlines the types of information that ought to be required. If the central
registries adopt the G8 Principles as the universal standard, they will be
well-positioned to supply agencies and governments with information
that will aid in the fight against tax evasion, money laundering and
terrorist financing. Indeed, these are some of the biggest problems
surrounding shell corporations.
C. The Information Exchange Standard
The G8 Principles require that companies track ownership, and
disclose that information to domestic authorities, such as central
141
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registries. The eighth principle of the G8 Principles is the most important
because it addresses getting company ownership information into the
hands of foreign jurisdictions that need it for enforcement purposes. 148
Despite the G8 support of an automatic exchange of information, the G8
Principles still only require information to be exchanged “upon
request.” 149 Furthermore, the G8 principles do not specify the type of
information that needs to be presented by the requesting country to make
a valid request regarding company ownership. The prevailing
international norms for a valid information request stem from the OECD
Model Treaty. Thus, it is likely that the countries implementing the G8
principles will follow the OECD Model Treaty’s requirements. 150 As
discussed in Part I, the OECD Model Treaty would require that the
requesting state possess a great deal of information in order to make a
valid request; it must be more than just “fishing expeditions.” 151
Fortunately, the leaders of the international community voiced their
support for revising the OECD Model Treaty to mandate an automatic
exchange of information. 152 As a result, information about the
beneficiaries of corporate vehicles such as “shell companies, special
purpose companies and trust arrangements,” could soon be subject to the
automatic exchange. 153 Consequently, information pertaining to
corporate beneficiaries would be made available to the states where those
beneficiaries are citizens and are subject to domestic taxes. While the G8
Principles place the burden on the OECD to mandate an automatic
exchange, its support will greatly increase the likelihood that the
automatic exchange mandate becomes a reality.
D. How Influential Will the Agreement Be?
One of the key limitations of the G8 Principles is that only eight
states are obligated to abide by them. In spite of this, the G8 Principles
remain influential on an international level because of the G8’s economic
strength. 154 Nevertheless, because it takes time for the international
community to build consensus and make changes, the most immediate
effects of the G8 Principles will come from within the member states.
This is because the G8 will need to look no further than itself to find tax
havens that will be affected by the G8 Principles.
148
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1. The United Kingdom
“About one-fifth of offshore tax havens, which are used by
multinationals to shelter cash from the tax authorities, are British
dependencies.” 155 Some of those tax havens include: Bermuda, British
Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Anguilla, Montserrat, Turks
and Caicos, Jersey, Guernsey, and the Isle of Man. 156 The United
Kingdom has aggressively addressed its tax haven problem by securing
“agreements from all the British Overseas Territories and Crown
Dependencies to publish their own action plans.” 157 In addition, the
United Kingdom has announced a deal with its crown dependencies and
overseas territories that will mandate an exchange of information. The
mandated exchange of information will be in regards to which foreign
companies bank their profits in those jurisdictions. 158
The United Kingdom released its action plan on June 18, 2013. 159
Ahead of the 2013 G8 summit, the United Kingdom had begun planning
the establishment of a registry that would contain information about
companies and their owners. 160 This registry of beneficial ownership
would potentially be made available to the public and would “make it
clear” who was ultimately benefiting from the use of corporate
vehicles. 161 On July 15, 2013, the plan for the creation of a registry was
published in a discussion paper called The Transparency & Trust:
Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing
Trust in UK Business. 162
The discussion paper addresses several key areas related to the abuse
of corporate vehicles that were also addressed in the G8 Principles. The
paper proposes that the registry should hold information about the
beneficiaries of every company that is incorporated in the United
Kingdom. 163 It discusses “what information should be provided to the
155
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registry; how frequently it should be updated; and how to ensure that it is
as accurate as possible.” 164 It also demonstrates the United Kingdom’s
intent to give all companies the necessary statutory tools to identify their
beneficial ownership; and the United Kingdom’s willingness to
determine “what additional requirements might be required to ensure
beneficial ownership information on all companies is indeed
obtained.” 165 The paper also advocates the prohibition of the creation of
new bearer shares, the conversion of existing bearer shares into
registered shares, and more transparency related to nominee directors.166
It is worth noting that the paper does acknowledge the limitations to
the United Kingdom’s proposed registry. For example, it states that it
“cannot require overseas companies operating in the UK to disclose
beneficial ownership information to a UK registry.” 167 The United
Kingdom is aware of some of the state sovereignty issues that FATCA
has encountered. 168 As a result, it calls for a more coordinated action at
the E.U. and global level. 169
2. The United States
The White House released its Action Plan on June 18, 2013. 170 The
United States pledged to create legislation aimed at addressing the
“‘criminal’ use of shell companies by forcing firms to declare their actual
or beneficial ownership.” 171 That pledge could be fulfilled by the
Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which
was introduced on August 1, 2013 by Senators Carl Levin, Chuck
Grassley, Dianne Feinstein, and Tom Harkin. 172
In Senator Levin’s floor statement introducing the bill, he stated that:
[the] bill would end the practice of our States forming
about 2 million new corporations each year for
unidentified persons, and instead require a list of the real
owners to be submitted so that, if misconduct later
occurred, law enforcement could access the owners list
and have a trail to chase, instead of confronting what has
all too often been a dead end. 173
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The Act seeks to achieve this goal by requiring that beneficial ownership
information be collected either by the countries directly or through
licensed formation agents. 174 Furthermore, it would require the
information 175 on the beneficiaries of corporate vehicles formed under
State law to be obtained, updated, and available upon the request of a
relevant agency. 176 The Act also addresses shelf corporations and extends
the beneficiary identification obligations to agents who sell them. 177
To ease the transition to the new rules, states would be given a twoyear transition period. This would give them time to set up mechanisms
to begin requesting information about the beneficiaries of existing
corporate vehicles. 178 The main enforcement mechanism for this Act
would be the use of state compliance reports that would occur every five
years. 179 The reports would identify any states that have not complied
with the Act 180 and would allow Congress to determine if further action
from the Federal Government is needed in order to address any lingering
issues related to the abuse of corporate vehicles.181
The Incorporation Transparency and Law Enforcement Assistance
Act, was introduced in response to United States’ G8 Action Plan and
embodies many of the principles from the G8 Principles. 182 It could have
a profound effect on the use of shell corporations because it is “easier to
obtain an anonymous shell company in the United States than almost
anywhere else in the world.” 183 Currently, the bill is in front of a Senate
committee. 184
IV. CONCLUSION
The G8’s support of an automatic exchange of information between
tax authorities and the G8 Principles’ increased reporting and recording
requirements relating to the identities of beneficiaries are major steps in
policing tax avoidance, money laundering, and other financial crimes
involving anonymous corporate vehicles. If the G8 Principles are
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effective, beneficiaries will undoubtedly have a much harder time
gaining and maintaining anonymity.
The next steps involve revising the OECD Model Treaty to institute
automatic exchanges and increasing pressures on countries to comply
with the standards set out within the G8 Principles. The automatic
exchange will undoubtedly fail to prevent the abuse of corporate vehicles
if countries do not record beneficiary information when corporations are
established and ownership changes hands. Without more countries
buying in, especially known tax havens, the international community has
a long way to go before corporate vehicles are no longer used for illicit
purposes. Benjamin Franklin once said that “[v]ice knows that she is
ugly, so she puts on her mask.” 185 It seems that the international
community has finally recognized that it is time for anonymous
beneficiaries to be forced to take off their masks.

185

92

PUPPET MASTERS, supra note 7, at 33.

